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HIPAA as a Political Football and Its Impact
on Informal Discovery in Employment Law
Litigation
Brian K. Powell* and Richard A. Bales**
I.

Introduction: A Political Football

The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act'
("HIPAA") is a bane of many employers;2 it has been aptly described as
the proverbial "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." 3 Many
have argued that the overly complex (some would say cryptic4 ) statute
and regulations hinder its enforceability.
One issue that has proven particularly vexatious is how HIPAA
affects a defendant-employer's ability to engage in ex parte contacts with
a plaintiff-employee's treating physician. The issue often arises in
employment cases when, for example, a defendant's counsel wants to
learn informally about the plaintiff's claim of emotional injuries.
Prior to the 1996 enactment of HIPAA, many jurisdictions explicitly
permitted a defendant-employer to engage in various degrees of ex parte
contact with a plaintiff-employee's treating physicians. Such informal
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** Richard A. Bales, Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law.
1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
2. Linda 0. Goldberg, Get Hip to HIPAA: New Privacy Rules Take Effect Soon,
HOT POINTS NEWSLETTER (Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C., Detroit, Mich.),
Winter 2002, at 1, 4.
3. Michael Rozen, MD, HIPAA Privacy Compliance for E-Health Sites,
www.ehcca.com/presentations/HIPAA2/607b.PDF (quoting Sir Winston Churchill) (last
visited Oct. 29, 2005).
4. Kate Jackson, Release the HIPAA Hounds, FOR THE RECORD, June 28, 2004, at
17, http://www.fortherecordmag.com/archives/ftr.062804pl7.shtml (last visited Oct. 29,
2005).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I111: 1

discovery was much faster and cheaper than formal discovery by
depositions and expert reports, and arguably helped dampen the overall
cost of litigation. However, HIPAA changed this dynamic profoundly
since the statute sets a high standard of privacy protection, and broadly
preempts contrary state law. Moreover, while plaintiff-employees can
use HIPAA to thwart informal discovery by defendant-employers,
defendant-employers cannot use HIPAA's privacy shield to thwart
discovery by plaintiff-employees of the defendant-employers' human
resources records. In this manner, HIPAA acts as both shield and sword
in favor of plaintiff-employees.
Threaded throughout consideration of this issue is the notion that
HIPAA is a statutory creature of politics-a "political football."5
Enacted in 1996 by the Presidential pen of a Democratic Administration,
its privacy guidelines were left for development and implementation by a
Republican one.6 The ebb and flow of politics shaped the creation of
HIPAA and will shape its future.7
Part II of this article examines pre-HIPAA informal discovery
including arguments for and against its permissibility, application and
examination of the practical consequences ex parte communications had
for plaintiffs and defendants alike, and state responses to ex parte
communications prior to the enactment of HIPAA.8 With the advent of
HIPAA, Part III turns to a discussion on the statutory text, both within
the original 1996 enactment as well as within the 2002 Privacy
Amendments. Part IV proceeds to recent, post-HIPAA developments
and the current state of unrest within the courts.
Some courts have taken the extreme approach that HIPAA flatly
prohibits ex parte contacts with a party's treating physician. This
approach has three policy advantages. First, it promotes frank and
earnest discussion between patient and physician. Second, it provides a
clear, bright-line rule, thereby establishing a baseline national standard
for the treatment of protected health information. Third, it levels the
playing field between the parties by curtailing informal fishing
expeditions by defendants.
However, these policy advantages are counterweighed by three
5. Addy Hatch, Health Care Bracesfor Rules: FederalPrivacyRegulations Could
Cost Medical Industry $20 Billion to $50 Billion, SPOKANE J. Bus. (Oct. 26, 2001),

available at https://www.dadair.com/spokanejoumal/index.php?id=article& sub-914&
keyword= (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
6. Id.
7. See generally Vladimir I. Lenin, Concerning a Caricature of Marxism and
Concerning Imperialist Economism, COLLECTED WORKS 79 (4th ed. 1949) ("Law is a
political tool; it is politics.").
8. See discussion infra Part II. The State of Illinois is a representative microcosm
of the national debate. Id.
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policy disadvantages to such a broad prohibition of ex parte contacts.
First, such a blanket prohibition results in increased litigation costs as
parties are limited to expensive means of formal discovery. Second, it
prolongs the discovery process, thereby eliminating the expediency that
informal discovery often brings to pre-trial discovery. Third, it promotes
trial inefficiency, taxing the courts in terms of their time and oversight.
Part V of this article argues that courts should adopt a compromise
position found in a New Jersey Superior Court case, Smith v. American
Home Products Corp.9 Smith carefully balances the privacy expectations
and standardization interests on the one hand with cost effectiveness and
judicial expediency on the other. Courts should do so by permitting
defendant-employers to engage in ex parte contacts with treating
physicians, but only within the protective controls afforded by state law.
This approach would cohesively blend federal privacy concerns with
state procedural independence, generating a salutary spirit of cooperative
federalism.
Part VI concludes with a retrospective analysis and future
speculation designed to answer the central question of whether HIPAA
represents a political touchdown or a political fumble.
II.

The Pre-Game: The Judicial Landscape Prior to the Enactment of
HIPAA

Setting the stage for the 1996 enactment of HIPAA necessarily
requires an examination of the "pre-game" situation. HIPAA was a
sociopolitical reaction (some would say appeasement °) to the ongoing
judicial review of plaintiff health care and privacy rights. How the preHIPAA courts viewed ex parte communications as a legitimate means of
legal discovery is a foundational component of this analysis, for it shaped
the debate over HIPAA's passage and subsequent 2002 Privacy
Amendments. Judicial response to the use of ex parte communications
varied by jurisdiction and depended upon which argument, pro versus
anti-informal discovery, successfully held sway. Illustrative of this
variety of arguments and judicial reasoning is the 1986 Illinois Appellate
Court decision, Petrillov. Syntex Laboratories.,Inc. 1 Because one finds
in Petrillo many of the arguments that echoed in courtrooms across the
country, which thereby set the backdrop against which the federal
HIPAA debate transpired, this article has selected Petrillo as the
9. Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm, 855 A.2d 608 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
10. Dick Armey, Just Gotta Learn From the Wrong Things You Done, CATO
JOURNAL Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring/Summer 2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
journal/cj22nlI/cj22nl.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
11. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952 (I11.
App. Ct. 1986).
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representative example of the national debate. 12
A.

Illinois as a Microcosm of the NationalDebate

The selection of Petrillo is not accidental. The land of Lincoln is
itself a reflection of American diversity. Its sociopolitical demographics
mirror those of the rest of the country, from rural, traditional areas in the
south to urban, progressive areas in the north. This blending separates
Illinois from those states so decisively liberal or conservative and makes
it an appropriate microcosm of the national debate.
I.

Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories., Inc. and its Progeny

The Illinois Appellate Court decision in Petrillo foreshadowed the
debate over the HIPAA discovery protocols.1 3 The case was a class
action products liability suit against Syntex Laboratories.' 4 During
discovery, however, defense counsel Thomas F. Tobin ("Tobin")
informed the trial court that he had engaged in ex parte communications
with one of Petrillo's treating physicians. 15 Plaintiffs' counsel balked
and asked for a prohibition against all future ex parte communications
with any of plaintiffs' treating physicians. 16 The trial court granted
plaintiffs' motion. 17 Thereafter, Tobin informed the court that he
intended to continue speaking ex parte with plaintiffs' treating
physicians because, in his view, the trial court erred in barring him from
such conferences. 18 The trial court found him in contempt of court and
fined him the sum of 1. 19

Tobin immediately appealed his contempt 20 and asserted twelve
rationales in support of the permissibility of ex parte communications
with plaintiffs' treating physicians. 21 These included the following:
(1) the lack of a public policy justification regarding patient-physician
confidentiality, (2) the fairness of having freely available information,
12. Within this area, today's employment law borrows extensively from tort law
(particularly products liability and medical malpractice claims). See id. at 962.
Reference to such case types is purposefully and unavoidable. See id.
13. Subsequently codified in 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2005).
14. Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 954.
15. Id. at 955.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Petrillo,499 N.E.2d at 956. The Petrillo trial was still proceeding. Id.
21. Id. at 955-56. The court divided these twelve justifications into two broad
categories: those addressing the patient-physician privilege and those addressing
Constitutional law claims. Id. at 955. Only those justifications relevant to the
overarching HIPAA discussion will be addressed in the body of this article.
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and (3) the costliness of formal discovery, in terms of time and money.
In Tobin's view, the tactical advantages, reduced costs and increased
judicial expediency, as well as the plaintiffs presumed waiver, by
placing his medical condition in dispute, warranted the continued
viability of ex parte conversations.23 The court, however, was foremost
concerned with the sanctity of the patient-physician relationship and the
public policy expectation that medical conversations remained
confidential.2 4 Therefore, it rejected Tobin's assertions and affirmed the
contempt order.25 In doing so, it announced what became known as the
Petrillo Doctrine: a judicial preference for and requirement of formal
discovery instead of unrestricted and unregulated informal discovery.26
Thus, Petrillo recognized the tendency of informal discovery to digress
into fishing expeditions for purposes of identifying alternative reasons
for the plaintiffs aggrieved condition, thereby preempting the discovery
process and placing the defendant on the road to summary judgment.2 7
As other states considered the Petrillo doctrine, or their own versions of
it, their acceptance or rejection of its holding led to a wide disparity in
28
the ex parte accessibility of plaintiffs health information.
Such a
divide was particularly discernable in pre-HIPAA litigation within the
context of employment law, to which this article now turns.
2.
Context

Ex Parte Communications within an Employment Law

The protective PetrilloDoctrine quickly found favor with plaintiffs'
attorneys partial to the Illinois court's expansive reading. As Robert S.
Mantell, an employment law attorney with the Boston firm of Rodgers,
Powers & Schwartz argued, liberal applications of state privacy law
"often favor[ed] a plaintiff-friendly interpretation. 29 Such was the result
22.
23.
24.

These justifications will be revisited and expanded upon in Part V infra.
Petrillo,499 N.E.2d at 955-57.
See id. at 971.

25. Id.
26. See id. For hypothetical illustrations: at the time of her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, had the plaintiff employee sought (concurrently or
previously) psychiatric care for another matter (death of a parent/child, for example) that
contributed to her delicate emotional state? Or, at the time of his wrongful termination
claim and request for general damages (e.g., pain and suffering), was the plaintiff
employee receiving therapy for another matter (divorce, for example) that contributed
to-if not caused-his state of depression? Affirmative answers to these questions
placed defendant employers on the road to summary judgment with informal discovery as
an attractive vehicle for getting there.
27. See Petrillo,499 N.E.2d at 957-59.
28. See, e.g., Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1375 (Alaska 1987).
29. See Robert S. Mantell, The Liberal Interpretation of Chapter 151B,
http://www.theemploymentlawyers.com/Articles/Chapter%20151 B.htm (last visited Nov.
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when Petrillo was applied by the Fifth District Appellate Court of
Illinois when it heard arguments in Lewis v. Illinois CentralRailroad Co.
in 1992.30 Thomas Lewis was severely injured while working for his
employer, Illinois Central Railroad.3 1 Ultimately, two of his discs were
removed and replaced by steel plates.32 Facing permanent nerve damage
and potential paralysis, Lewis could no longer work and filed suit against
the Railroad.3 3 During pretrial discovery, the Railroad engaged in ex
parte talks with several of Lewis's treating physicians.34 The Railroad
apparently was banking on the physicians' desires to avoid timely
depositions, and the physicians did not disappoint; in fact, upon the
Railroad's request, seven produced the medical records which contained
the entirety of Lewis's medical care, which were not limited to the scope
of his workplace injuries. 35 Lewis formally objected to these ex parte
contacts, and the trial court granted the sanctions prohibiting the Railroad
from using the acquired medical information and from conducting such
additional examinations. 36 At the trial's conclusion, a jury awarded
Lewis $3,935,350 in damages.3 7
The Railroad appealed on several grounds. Chief among its
complaints was that the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning it
for communicating ex parte with Lewis's physicians in violation of the
Petrillo Doctrine.3 8 On appeal, the Railroad argued that no Petrillo
violation had occurred because the communications were written, not
spoken.39 The Illinois Appellate Court dismissed this technical reading,
stating that Petrillo aimed to protect the patient-physician privilege in
toto and that such a privilege extended to written records. 40 The Railroad
also argued that the patient-physician privilege was not implicated
because its communications were sent to the records' custodians and not
to the physicians themselves. 41 The court dismissed this distinction as
"wholly artificial and completely meaningless, 42 citing to precedent that
a request of the custodian is a request of the medical practitioner
5, 2005) (arguing that Chapter 151B of Massachusetts' anti-discrimination statute
requires a liberal interpretation to properly effectuate the purposes of the statute).
30. Lewis v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 600 N.E.2d 504 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992).
31. Id. at 506.
32. Id. at 507.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 509.
35. Lewis, 600 N.E.2d at 509.
36. Id. at 509-10.
37. Id. at 509.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 510.
40. Id.
41. Lewis, 600 N.E. 2d at 510.
42. Id. at 520-21.
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himself.43 The appellate court affirmed the lower court's sanction,
concluding that the Railroad's conduct struck at the heart of patientphysician privilege and amounted to an egregious misstep that was no
different than saying, "[t]ell me everything you know about Lewis's
medical history." 4
Such was wholly prohibited by the Petrillo
45
doctrine.
Contrast the Petrillo and Lewis state law rulings with that of
Patterson v. Caterpillar,Inc.,46 a 1995 ruling of the federal Seventh
Circuit in which Illinois geographically resides. Lonnie Patterson
("Patterson"), a Wisconsin resident and career employee at Caterpillar,
was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1984 and began a medical leave
of absence under Caterpillar's Disability Plan ("the Plan"). 47 Under the
terms of the Plan, as long as Patterson was deemed "totally disabled," he
was entitled to receive his monthly income and company health
benefits.48 During the next five years, Patterson regularly submitted the
necessary medical information from his treating physician, Dr. Cass
Terry, which allowed him to maintain his total disability benefits.49 In
1989, however, Caterpillar reassessed Patterson's condition and, after a
company-sponsored medical examination and ten months of private
investigation, concluded that Patterson no longer met the Plan standard
for total disability.50 Patterson filed suit under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), seeking reinstatement of
benefits. 51 In its defense, Caterpillar listed Dr. Terry, a noted authority in
the field of multiple sclerosis, as an expert witness and conducted ex
parte talks with him.52 Patterson objected, and following a bench trial,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
overruled the objection and awarded judgment in favor of Caterpillar.5 3
Patterson appealed.54
On appeal, Patterson contended that Caterpillar's ex parte
communications with Dr. Terry were public policy violations of the
patient-physician privilege. Although in federal court, Patterson argued
43. Id. (citing Roberson v. Liu, 555 N.E.2d 999, 1003 (I11.
App. 1990)).
44. Lewis, 600 N.E.2d at 511.
45. Id. at 512.
46. Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1995).
47. Id. at 504.
48. Id. The Plan, in part, designated an employee as "totally disabled if he is not
engaged in regular employment or occupation for remuneration or profit." Id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 504-05.
51. Patterson,70 F.3d at 504-05.
52. Id. at 506-07.
53. Id. at 504.
54. Id. at 505.
55. Id. at 506.
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that Wisconsin law governed the patient-physician relationship.
Consequently, he argued, any ex parte talks between Caterpillar and Dr.
Terry violated the privilege and were therefore prohibited. 5 6 The court
rejected this argument, however, because ERISA fell under federal
question jurisdiction, which does not recognize a patient-physician
privilege.57 Moreover, the court ruled that even if it were to recognize
such a privilege, Patterson's argument would fail because Dr. Terry's
role at trial was limited to that of an expert witness regarding the nature
of multiple sclerosis:
Although he was one of Patterson's treating physicians, Dr. Terry
offered no testimony based on this physician-patient relationship.
For example, with respect to the relative importance of a formal
neurological examination in determining disability, Dr. Terry
testified that 85 percent of
the information can be derived through
58
observation of the patient.
In the alternative, Patterson argued that the communication of such
commentary and insight by a treating physician to an adverse party, and
that adverse party's subsequent decision to call plaintiffs treating
physician as a witness, gave the appearance of impropriety and amounted
to ex parte communications sufficient to taint Dr. Terry's testimony.59
The court again disagreed and noted that Patterson's assessment of state
law was wrong: in Steinberg v. Jensen, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
expressly allowed ex parte communications in limited situations despite
the patient-physician privilege. 60 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
neither federal law nor state law prohibited Dr. Terry's communications
because he never disclosed confidential information about Patterson to
Caterpillar. 6'
Such communications fell outside of ex parte
prohibitions. 62 Ergo, the court concluded that Dr. Terry was free to
63
speak with Caterpillar or to testify on its behalf.
B.

JurisdictionalPosturePrior to HIPAA

The arguments presented before Illinois state courts and the Seventh
Circuit were echoed in courtrooms across the nation. In jurisdictions

56. Id.
57. Patterson, 70 F.3d at 506-07 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28
(1977); U.S. v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 1988)).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Patterson,70 F.3d at 507.
Id.
Id. (citing Steinberg v. Jensen, 534 N.W.2d 361, 370 (1995)).

Id.
Id.
Id.
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adopting the plaintiff-friendly approach of Illinois, employers had only
the tools of formal discovery to acquire employee medical records.6 4
This resource-consuming approach often frustrated defendant-employer
summary judgment efforts.65 Conversely, in jurisdictions adopting the
defendant-friendly approach of Wisconsin and the Seventh Circuit, ex
parte communications were permissible as a means of free discovery,
giving employers a tactical edge and insight into their employees' mental
and physical health.6 6
At the close of 1995 and on the eve of HIPAA, states were split on
the availability of ex parte informal discovery.67 In addition to Illinois,
eighteen jurisdictions expressly denied such discovery.6 8 Twenty
64. See infra note 68.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004) (noting
that ex parte contacts were key tools for the defense, allowing for the element of surprise
that could alter-if not dispose of-the case at bar).
67. See infra notes 68 & 69.
68. See Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830-31 (Ala. 1973) (ruling that employers
do not have a legitimate interest in knowing each and every detail of an employee's
health); Duquette v. Superior Court, 778 P.2d 634, 642 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that "defense counsel in a medical malpractice action may not engage in non-consensual
ex parte communications with plaintiff's treating physicians"); Perez v. E. Airlines, Inc.,
569 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that ex parte communications
between treating physician and defendant employer are disallowed absent plaintiff
permission); Cua v. Morrison, 636 N.E.2d 1248, 1248 (Ind. 1994) (ruling that ex parte
communications pose a "substantial threat that privileged information would be
disclosed.., such information is not required for fair and efficient trial preparation");
Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P'ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1986) (ruling that
forced consent to ex parte interviews with plaintiffs' health care providers was
inconsistent Iowa law); La. C.E. Art. 510 (1993) (by code, there is no Louisiana case
interpreting the statutory ex parte limitation); Scott by & Through Scott v. Flynt, 704 So.
2d 998, 1007 (Miss. 1996) (holding that "evidence obtained from ex parte contacts,
without prior patient consent, by the opposing party which is subsequently used during a
legal proceeding, is inadmissible"); Jaap v. District Court of the Eighth Judicial Dist., 623
P.2d 1389, 1392 (Mont. 1981) (holding that exparte contacts defeat open disclosure and,
therefore, undermine the prime objective of the Rules of Discovery); Nelson v. Lewis,
534 A.2d 720, 723 (N.H. 1987) (holding that one who places his medical condition at
issue does not waive the physician-patient privilege so as to permit the interview of
treating physicians exparte); Church's Fried Chicken No. 1040 v. Hanson, 845 P.2d 824,
828-29 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling impermissible any ex parte oral discussions by an
employer or insurer with a worker's treating physician); Stoller v. Moo Young Jun, 499
N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (denying a special request for an ex parte
interview with treating physician); Crist v. Moffatt, 389 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 1990) (holding
that public policy considerations prohibit defense counsel from interviewing plaintiffs
treating physicians ex parte without plaintiff's express consent); Bohrer v. Merrill-Dow
Pharm., Inc., 122 F.R.D. 217, 219 (D.N.D. 1987) (ruling that North Dakota law afforded
physicians the discretion to refuse to speak with defense counsel and nothing short of
formal discovery via subpoena could compel a treating physician to discuss pertinent
medical information); Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1974) (by
implication) (ruling that unauthorized disclosure of protected patient-physician
information was a violation of public policy and, therefore, actionable as physician

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I111: 1

jurisdictions (including Wisconsin) allowed ex parte communications to
varying degrees, depending upon the courts' interpretations of the
patient-physician privilege and patient waiver. 69 Against this backdrop,
malpractice); Homer v. Rowan Cos., 153 F.R.D. 597, 601 (D. Tex. 1994) (citing Texas
evidentiary rules and concluding that unauthorized disclosures of medical records defeat
the purpose of the patient-physician privilege); Loudon v. Mhyre, 756 P.2d 138, 142
(Wash. 1988) (holding that defense counsel may not engage in ex parte contacts with a
plaintiffs physicians); State ex rel. Kitzmiller, 437 S.E.2d 452, 455 (W. Va. 1993)
(holding that ex parte communications were prohibited because "they pose the danger of
disclosing irrelevant medical information that may compromise the confidential nature of
the doctor-patient relationship without advancing any legitimate object of discovery");
Wardell v. McMillan, 844 P.2d 1052, 1067 (Wyo. 1992) (concluding that ex parte
communications violate public policy by pitting "physician against patient, potentially
destroying a mutually beneficial relationship").
69. See Langdon v. Champion, 745 P.2d 1371, 1375 (Alaska 1987) (holding exparte
communications are permitted under Alaskan law: "to disallow a viable, efficient, cost
effective method of ascertaining the truth because of the mere possibility of abuse,
smacks too much of throwing out the baby with the bath water"); King v. Ahrens, 798 F.
Supp. 1371, 1378 (D. Ark. 1992) (concluding that Arkansas law allows for physicians to
elect to speak with defense counsel in spite of plaintiff's protests); Heller v. Norcal Mut.
Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 999, 1006 (Cal. 1994) (concluding that plaintiff placed her physical
condition in dispute and had no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding her medical
records); Samms v. District Court, 908 P.2d 520, 526 (Colo. 1995) (holding that exparte
communications with treating physicians are permissible with reasonable notice to
opposing counsel); Green v. Bloodsworth, 501 A.2d 1257, 1259 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985)
(holding that, although not compelled to speak ex parte with defense counsel, treating
physicians may do so in spite of plaintiffs objections without fear of reprisal for
violation of the patient-physician privilege because such privileges are waived); Orr v.
Sievert, 292 S.E.2d 548, 550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that a plaintiff who places
his medical condition in dispute waives any patient-physician privilege, and to ban
communication between defense counsel and the treating physician would unfairly
advantage a plaintiff by unfairly restraining the physician); Pearce v. Ollie, 826 P.2d 888,
889-90 (Idaho 1992) (noting that nonconsensual ex parte interviews between defense
counsel and plaintiffs treating physicians was not sanctionable); Bryant v. Hilst, 136
F.R.D. 487, 488 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing K.S.A. 60-427(d) and noting that Kansas law
provided no patient-physician privilege in an action where the condition of the claimant
was in dispute); Roberts v. Estep, 845 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Ky. 1993) (noting that plaintiffs
reliance on the Petrillo doctrine was misplaced and that Kentucky law has no similar
prohibitions on ex parte communications); Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30 (Mich.
1991) (concluding that, where plaintiff places his medical condition in dispute, Michigan
law presumes the patient-physician privilege waived and allows the treating physician to
conduct ex parte interviews); Blohm v. Minneapolis Urological Surgeons, P.A., 449
N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1989) (holding that ex parte discussions between defense
counsel and treating physician do not constitute discovery); Brandt v. Pelican, 856
S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo. 1993) (holding that Missouri law prohibited the court from
requiring medical authorizations before plaintiff's treating physician could engage in ex
parte discussions); Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857, 863-65 (N.J. 1985) (holding that,
in order to encourage less costly means of discovery, authorizations to engage in ex parte
communications would be compelled should plaintiff withhold consent); Covington v.
Sawyer, 458 N.E.2d 465, 471 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting plaintiffs claim that ex
parte conferences between defense counsel and plaintiffs treating physicians tainted the
physicians' testimony); Seaberg v. Lockard, 800 P.2d 230, 231 (Okla. 1990) (holding that
plaintiff placing his medical condition in dispute sufficiently waives his patient-physician
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the stage was set for congressional action.
III.

The Great Kickoff: 1996 HIPAA and the 2002 Privacy
Amendments

A.

Why HIPAA. . .
1.

Historical Backdrop

HIPAA's genesis occurred in 1993 when First Lady Hillary
Rodham Clinton spearheaded an exhaustive attempt to overhaul
American health care. She delivered her Health Security Act to a
Democratically-controlled Congress in October 1993.70 Decried by
conservatives as the "single largest and most ambitious power grab [by
liberals] in the history of American health care, '' 1 this sweeping,
controversial proposal to achieve universal health care for all Americans
landed with a thud and died under its own weight by Labor Day of the
following year.7 2 With the Republican ascendancy to Congressional
privilege and consents to ex parte communications between treating physicians and
defense counsel); MacDonald v. United States, 767 F. Supp. 1295, 1300 (M.D. Pa. 1991)
(rejecting the notion of a public policy in Pennsylvania prohibiting ex parte contact with
treating physicians); Lewis v. Roderick, 617 A.2d 119, 122 (R.I. 1992) (citing the cost
effectiveness of ex parte communications and concluding that Rhode Island does not
preclude such conversations between plaintiffs treating physician and defense counsel);
Felder v. Wyman, 139 F.R.D. 85, 91 (D.S.C. 1991) (concluding that South Carolina law
allows for ex parte communications where plaintiff's physical condition is at issue);
Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Tenn. 1965) (concluding that
communications between physician and patient were not privileged at common law and
that Tennessee had not altered the rule by statute).
70. Cynthia Dailard, Contraceptive Coverage: A Ten-Year Retrospective, The
Guttmacher Report on Public Policy (June 2004), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
tgr/07/2/gr070206.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
71. Richard A. Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy: Its Unintended and Intended
Consequences, CATO JOURNAL
Vol.
22,
No.
1 (Spring/Summer
2002),
https://www.cato.org/pubs/joumal/cj22nl/cj22nl -3.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
72. Dailard, supra note 70. Then and now, critics on the Left and Right attribute
Hillary Clinton's mismanagement and overreach as the fatal blow that brought down a
Democratically-controlled Congress. John F. Harris, Heeding the Past as She Looks to
the Future: Centrist Strategy Shapes Hillary Clinton's Politics, WASH. POST (May 31,
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/30/AR2005053
001004_pf. html (last visited Oct. 16, 2005). As stated in the Left-leaning Washington
Post: "More than any politician still in power, she is identified with the strategic
miscalculations of 1993 and 1994 that vaulted congressional Republicans into the
majority status they have held since." Id. Accord Dailard, supra note 68 ("[P]artially in
response to what many critics deemed the Clinton health care debacle, the "Republican
revolution" would place Republicans in control of both houses of Congress for the first
time in decades, and in many governorships across the nation."). But see Armey, supra
note 10 ("People don't realize how close we came to passing the Clinton Plan in the
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control in January 1995, the prospects for health care-related or HIPAAtype legislation seemed bleak.
Having defeated the Health Security Act, the new Republican
Congress nonetheless recognized the emotional sentiment tapped by
"Clinton Care." 73 The Republican majority began debate on a series of
its own health care initiatives "as a way to make the political point that
[its] new majority could govern and be compassionate at the same
time., 74 The culmination in this political game of pass the ball came in
1996 with the enactment of HIPAA.
2.

Preliminary Goals

What began as a limited means of addressing two pervasive
concerns plaguing the health care industry, which included portability of
coverage and elimination of Medicare fraud, quickly made its way into
the nebulous realm of privacy rights.75 As House Majority Leader Dick
Armey would later recall, "[HIPAA] started out as a modest little bill,
claiming to make coverage portable from job to job... [and to crack]
down on Medicare fraud., 76 House Ways and Means Committee Reports
seemingly substantiate Armey's assessment: "In order to address the
problem of health care cost inflation and make insurance more
affordable, it is important to focus on key sources affecting levels of the
underlying health care costs. Two key sources of excessive cost are
medical fraud and abuse, and the current medical paperwork burden."7 7
This Committee assessment, which noted that as much as ten
percent of total health care costs were lost to fraud and abuse, gave
HIPAA enough bounce to pass the conservatively-dominated House.78
The less conservative Senate, however, had a more expansive agenda for
HIPAA, and during House-Senate Conference, the following additional
provisions were added to the limited goals cited above: promotion and
use of medical savings accounts, improved access to long-term care
services and coverage, simplification of health insurance administration,
and privacy of individually identifiable health information. 79 Of
summer of 1994. What could have been a catastrophe for America turned out to be a
catastrophe for the Democrats. The fact that they proposed it is the biggest reason we
took control of Congress that year." (emphasis added)).
73.
74.
75.

Armey, supra note 10.
Id.
Id.

76. Id.
77. Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 256, 267 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.R. REP.No.
104-496, at 69-70 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865, 1869).
78. Id.
79. H.R. REP. No 104-736, at 1, 3 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 142 CONG.
REc. H9473 (daily ed. July 31, 1996).
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particular import were the privacy regulations reserved for future
promulgation at the discretion of the Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS"). 80 In this form, HIPAA passed both Houses of
Congress as an amendment to the Social Security Act, and with
Presidential approval, it became law in 1996."1
B.

.

. And What Does it Mean for Employers? The Reach of HIPAA

1. The Regulatory Provisions:
Information

Covered Entities and Protected

As enacted in 1996, HIPAA did little to disrupt day-to-day
employer activities; it was intended as a means of improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of health care systems by encouraging the
use of electronic data interchange. 82 In this regard, HIPAA was a
sleeping giant.8 3 The wakeup call for employers came with the Privacy
Rules promulgated by HHS in August 2002.84 These rules, designed to
regulate the means by which electronic health data would be securely
transmitted, contained aggressive compliance regulations that affected
not only the delivery of health care services in America but also the
means by which employers do business with the health care industry and
handle employee records in the process. 85 Ostensibly, the HIPAA
privacy rules prevent regulated entities from accessing and disseminating
individually identifiable health information without first obtaining the
proper permission of the patient.86 In practice, however, identifying who
qualifies as a "regulated entity" has generated a great deal of confusion
and anxiety for America's employers. 87 Determining who and what are
regulated is the first step in addressing employer misunderstandings.
The 2002 HIPAA Amendments list three types of organizations that
80. 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002). These promulgations were handed down
by HHS on August 14, 2002, to be effective on October 15,2002. Id.
81. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-164.534 (2005).
82. Peter Greaney, Countdown to HIPAA: Avoid The Crush By Being Prepared
WORK CARE, INC., Jan. 29, 2003, http://www.workcare.com/knowledge/ doctors-desk
_2003_05.asp.
83. Ryan D. Meade, Handling Employees' Health Information: HIPAA Targets the
HR Department, ABA BusINEss LAW TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2001, http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/bIt/2001 -11 -12/meade.html.
84. See supra text accompanying note 80.
85. Meade, supra note 83.
86. Id.
87. Maria Rodriguez & Tracy Silver, HIPAA-Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996: Why All the HOOPLAH About HIPAA?, SILVER &
FREEDMAN, http://www.silver-freedman.com/pressroom/hippa rml.html (last visited

Nov. 7, 2005).
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(1) health plans, (2) health care
qualify as "covered entities":
clearinghouses, and (3) health care providers who transmit health
information in electronic format.88 Covered entities either create or come
into possession of "Individually Identifiable Health Information," which
recounts an individual's past, present, and future physical or mental
health care. 89 With limited exceptions, Individually Identifiable Health
Information is also known as "Protected Health Information" ("PHI"). 90
Information becomes PHI when it is transmitted or maintained in either
Essentially, therefore, all
electrical format or other medium. 91
accumulated health data falls under the regulatory ambit.
Employers are fair to question the extent to which HIPAA applies.
After all, most businesses do not act in the capacity of a covered entity.
Employers are indirectly regulated, however, when they sponsor and
provide group health benefits to their employees and interact with
The fact that most
Individually Identifiable Health Information.9 2
employers do not qualify as covered entities is irrelevant. Under the
Privacy Rules, covered entities, including health care providers, are
required to enter into "business-associate agreements" with parties, like
individual businesses, who interact with Individually Identifiable Health
Information. 93 These agreements require employers to give covered
entities satisfactory assurances that they will safeguard the
confidentiality of the PHI they receive or maintain as if they were
covered entities themselves.94 Consequently, as a practical matter, all
employers must become HIPAA compliant. 95 Additionally, and as
demonstrated in Section II above and Sections IV and V below, the
disclosure and acquisition of PHI, particularly via ex parte
communications, becomes a serious bone of contention in employeeemployer litigated matters where the employer's desire to limit the costs
associated with formal discovery conflicts with the plaintiffs desire to
protect the confidentiality of his medical history.
The Regulatory Provisions: Disclosures

2.

Covered entities are permitted to disclose PHI without the patient's
88.

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).

89.

Id.

90.

Id. Exempted from PHI categorization are (1) education records covered by the

Family Educational Right and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; and
(2) employment records held by a covered entity in its role as employer (emphasis
added). Id.

91.

45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
Meade, supra note 83.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.

92.
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written authorization to provide continued treatment, facilitate payment,
and investigate fraud.96 Absent these circumstances, a covered entity is
generally prohibited from using or disclosing PHI without the patient's
written authorization as defined by the Privacy Rules.97 In employment
litigation, the Privacy Rules operate as a gag order on health care
providers, prohibiting any disclosure of PHI to a defendant-employer
absent the plaintiff-employee's written authorization.98 This raises the
issue of whether there is an applicable HIPAA guideline for situations in
which plaintiff-employees are unwilling to provide release
authorizations.
Section 164.512(e) permits discovery of PHI in judicial and
administrative proceedings where a plaintiff-employee is unwilling to
provide written release authorizations.9 9 According to this section,
unauthorized disclosures are permitted in the following two instances:
(1) in response to a formal court order; 100 or (2) in the absence of a court
order but in response to traditional discovery methods, such as a
subpoena, a discovery request, or other lawful process.'0 1 The second
provision, however, contains a notable caveat: where no formal court
order exists, the covered entity must receive from the defendantemployer either "satisfactory assurances" 10 2 or a qualified protective
order ("QPO")10 3 before disclosing the PHI. The covered entity receives
satisfactory assurances when the defendant-employer demonstrates its
good faith attempt to provide a written notice to the plaintiffemployee.10 4
Notice includes sufficient information about the
proceeding, permits the plaintiff-employee to object, 0 5 and demonstrates
that the time allowance for objections has elapsed. 10 6 Absent satisfactory
assurances, the QPO may be implicated, (1) prohibiting the parties from
using or disclosing the PHI for any purpose other than the litigation or
proceeding,107 and (2) requiring the return or destruction of the PHI at the
end of the litigation or proceeding.10 8 Because HIPAA regulates PHI
96.

45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c) (2005).

97. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) (requiring, at a minimum, the patient's name,
authorized recipients, a description of the information to be disclosed and its purpose, an
expiration date, and authorized signatures).
98. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c) (2005).
99. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2005).
100. Id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(i).
101. Id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(ii).
102. Id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(A).
103. Id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(B).
104. Id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(iii)(A).
105. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(iii)(B) (2005).
106. Id. at § 164.512(e)(l)(iii)(C).
107. Id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(v)(A).
108. Id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(v)(B).
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disclosure by the covered entity and not by the defendant-employer, the
covered entity is always empowered to make "reasonable efforts" to
independently seek or verify the existence of satisfactory assurances or a
QPO before complying with any request. 10 9
These new disclosure provisions change the dynamic within those
jurisdictions following the Seventh Circuit's logic in Patterson v.
1 1 ° This is the equivalent of sidelining informal discovery
Caterpillar.
and shifting control of the ball deep within the plaintiff-employee's end
zone. Implicitly, it would appear that the Petrillo Doctrine is now the
governing standard, thereby precluding ex parte communications as a
means of permissible discovery.111 For employers, this would be
disheartening news, especially if the result were to obliterate existing
employment law maxims that permit employers to attack those medical
conditions placed in dispute by employees.1 12 Sections IV and V below
consider these important implications; however, a discussion of
HIPAA's preemption provisions must first be conducted.
3.

The Regulatory Provisions: Preemption of State Laws

HIPAA is a federal floor, not a ceiling. 1 3 It serves not as a doctrine
of unilateral federal preemption but as a minimum standard of care to be
extended to PHI.' 14 Determination of HIPAA's "stringency standard" 1is5
critical when determining whether federal or state law applies. '
HIPAA defines state law as "a constitution, statute, regulation, rule,
116
common law, or other State action having the force and effect of law."
Where an employer cannot comply with both state and federal law (i.e.,
where state law is contrary to HIPAA requirements), courts will make a
preemption assessment using Section 160.202.117 First, the court must
109. See id. at § 164.512(e)(1)(vi).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 46-63.
111. See id.
112. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996); accord Schoffstall v. Henderson,
223 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2000); Jackson v. Chubb Corp., 193 F.R.D. 216, 225 (D.N.J.
2000); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Vann v.
Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 346, 349-50 (C.D. I11.1997); EEOC
v. Danka Indus., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1997).
113. Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2005); accord Smith v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm., 855 A.2d 608, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 2003).
114. See Leavitt, 428 F.3d at 174.
115. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2005) ("The provision of State law relates
to the privacy of individually identifiable health information and is more stringent than a
standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under subpart E of part
164 of this subchapter.").
116. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2005).
117. Id.
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determine if state law provides "specific purposes of protecting the
privacy of health information or affects the privacy of health information
in a direct, clear, and substantial way."'1 18 If state law does not, then
119
preemption is not implicated and HIPAA governs as the federal floor.
If state law does, however, then the court must continue its assessment
by determining if the affected state law more stringently protects a
patient's PHI than HIPAA. 120 Recall that HIPAA is the mandatory floor,
and if state law is less protective of PHI, then HIPAA will preempt state
law and govern the judicial or administrative proceeding.1 2 1 If, however,
state law is more 12stringent,
HIPAA is inapplicable and defers to
2
law.
state
applicable
IV. Half-Time: Recent Developments in HIPAA Litigation and
Potential Impact for Employers
The 2002 HIPAA Privacy Amendments (a/k/a the Privacy Rules)
took effect on April 14, 2003.123 Given the relative recency of these
enactments, case law is just now bubbling up. The Privacy Rules were
24
first involved in a series of tort cases that included Law v. Zuckerman,'
a U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Maryland medical
malpractice action, and Crenshaw v. MONY Life, 2 a U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of California insurance law action. Since these
tort cases set the tone for subsequent employment law litigation, they
will be discussed first.
A.

Tort and Insurance Cases as a Precursorfor Employment Law
Developments
1.

Law v. Zuckerman

In Law v. Zuckerman, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Maryland ruled that HIPAA preempted Maryland law and that
HIPAA expressly declared the end of informal discovery within the
federal district. 126 Rosalynn Law brought a medical malpractice action

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2005).
122. Id.
123. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2002). Small health plans were given until April 14, 2004,
to comply. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(b)(2) (2002).
124. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705 (S.D. Md. 2004).
125. Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2004).
126. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
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against Dr. David Zuckerman in federal court based on diversity of
citizenship.127 After Law disclosed her medical records to Zuckerman,
his defense counsel met with Law's treating physician, Dr. Thomas
Pinckert, and engaged in ex parte communications. 28 Zuckerman also
listed Dr. Pinckert as one of his fact witnesses. 29 Citing HIPAA's
Privacy Rules, Law moved to preclude further ex parte interviews with
Dr. Pinckert.130 At issue before the court was the permissibility of
Zuckerman's continued ex parte contact with Dr. Pinckert.' 3'
Judge Charles B. Day began his assessment by noting that neither
Maryland law nor HIPAA expressly precluded all ex parte
32
communications with a treating physician for an adverse party.1
Notwithstanding, Judge Day also acknowledged that HIPAA clearly
regulated the methods of PHI disclosure. 33 As such, any conflicts
between state and federal law required resolution under HIPAA's
stringency standard before proceeding. 34 Judge Day then rejected
Zuckerman's contention that the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical
Records Act ("MCMRA") was more stringent and, therefore,
controlling. 135 Judge Day concluded that MCMRA provided Law with
less control over her medical records than did HIPAA and was, therefore,
preempted by HIPAA's federal floor. 136 Judge Day denied Law's
motion, however, noting that during pretrial litigation, Zuckerman's
counsel operated under a good faith belief that MCMRA governed,
which would have allowed such ex parte interviews. 37 With the advent
of HIPAA, the trial court erected appropriate barriers, including a
complete ban on Dr. Pinckert's testimony should his testimony 38stray into
proscribed areas, to effectively remedy any potential violation.
In so holding, the District Court declared that in the Southern
District of Maryland, informal discovery of PHI was now prohibited by
HIPAA absent patient consent. 39 This was a dramatic step within the
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 709.
136. Id. at 709-11. "HIPAA's permissive disclosure requirements give each patient
more control over the dissemination of their medical records than MCMRA, while
MCMRA sacrifices the patient's control of their [PHI] in order to expedite malpractice
litigation." Id. at 711.
137. Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 713.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 711.
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State of Maryland, which had not previously ruled on the permissibility
of ex parte conversations. Nonetheless, Judge Day decisively articulated
its unwelcomeness within his federal jurisdiction, a holding that would
resonate within insurance and employment law in ways that will be
discussed below.
2.

Crenshaw v. MONY Life

The issue of HIPAA's preemption in federal diversity cases also
arose in Crenshaw v. MONY Life Insurance Co. 140 In 1976, Roger
Crenshaw, a psychiatrist, purchased a disability insurance policy from
Mutual of New York Life Insurance Company ("MONY") and
maintained that coverage through October 1998.41 At that time, he
claimed an inability to continue his practice and filed for disability
benefits pursuant to his policy. 142 Crenshaw sought treatment and
obtained disability certification from Dr. Jeffrey Harris. 143 MONY began
payments in February 1999, but discontinued them in May 2002
subsequent to a follow-up investigation. 144 Crenshaw then filed suit one
week later.145 During discovery, MONY contacted Dr. Harris, conducted
ex parte interviews with him, and ultimately, listed him as a defense
expert witness.14 6 Crenshaw invoked the Privacy Rules and raised
numerous objections and motions 47to disqualify MONY's counsel and to
disqualify Dr. Harris's testimony.
Regarding only those motions pertaining to HIPAA, the court noted
that HIPAA materially altered the means by which physicians practicing
in California were permitted to disclose PHI. 48 Because California law
did not prohibit all ex parte contacts, the court found such practices in
conflict with the letter and spirit of HIPAA. "49 The court referenced Law
v. Zuckerman and stated: "HIPAA and the standards promulgated by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services ("'Secretary"') in the Code of
Federal Regulations set for the baseline for the release of health
information."' 150 Based on the statutory text of HIPAA and the decision
in Law v. Zuckerman, the court reasoned that HIPAA governed unless
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
2004)).

Crenshaw v. MONY Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1027 (S.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at 1018.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
Id. at 1017-18.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1027 (quoting Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708 (S.D. Md.
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state law proved more stringent.' 5' By employing Byrd-balancing, 52 the
court weighed California's interest in having its rules recognized by
federal courts with the federal courts' interest in enforcing federal
principles and obtaining uniform outcome. 53 The scales tipped in favor
54
of federal interests, and the court ruled that HIPAA governed.
Notwithstanding, the U.S. District Court refused to suppress Dr. Harris's
testimony, concluding that lesser sanctions remained available to remedy
the situation55 and that Crenshaw's request was extreme and
unwarranted.
Crenshaw, like Law, reflected the post-Privacy Rules tendency of
federal courts to liberally construe the HIPAA Preemption Doctrine.
Prior to 1996, the State of Maryland had not specifically ruled on the
permissibility of ex parte communications, whereas California had
ruled. 156 Neither state passed the HIPAA stringency standard, and
consequently, the federal floor of HIPAA came crashing down on both
state prerogatives. 57 Combined, these cases demonstrate an increasing
federal encroachment on state PHI regulatory law deemed inconsistent
with, or less stringent than, HIPAA Section 160.202. They serve as a
harbinger of future developments in the employment law context.
B. Ex Parte Developments in the Employment Law Context
Disputes within the employment law context over the continued
permissibility of ex parte communications in light of the 2002 Privacy
Rules have only recently surfaced. As seen above, other legal disciplines
previously considered the subject. 58
As such, courts invoking
employment law borrow heavily from those holdings. 59 For plaintiffemployees, this represents a positive development, for those courts
liberally construed the Preemption Doctrine against the ex parte interests
of defendants. 60 This trend was repeated in employment law cases,

151. Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1028.
152. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958)
(concluding that federal practices supersede state practices if the state procedure is "not a
rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the
parties").
153.
154.

Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.
Id.

155.

Id. at 1030-31.

156.

See supra note 69.

157.
158.
159.

See supra note 69.
See supra Part IV.A and accompanying text
See, e.g., EEOC v. Boston Market Corp., No. CV 03-4227, 2004 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 27338 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004).
160
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beginning with EEOC v. Boston Market Corp.161
1.

EEOC v. Boston Market and the HIPAA Preemption Doctrine

Following the 2002 HIPAA privacy amendments, Boston Market
represented the first employment-related judicial pronouncement on the
continuing viability of exparte communications between defense council
and plaintiffs treating physician. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") prosecuted this case on behalf of plaintiff
Christine Gagliardi, who alleged discrimination claims pursuant to Title
VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") against her former
employer, Boston Market Corporation ("Boston Market").162 Before the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Boston
Market presented a motion for an order permitting it to engage in ex
parte communications with a variety of individuals, including two of
Gagliardi's psychologists. 16 3 All parties agreed that Gagliardi had placed
her medical condition at issue and that Boston Market was, therefore,
entitled to receive Gagliardi's medical records and physician
statements. 164 Both Gagliardi and the EEOC, however, objected to
Boston Market's request to hold ex parte talks with Gagliardi's treating
physicians, arguing that HIPAA and various New York privileges and
privacy rights precluded such ex parte interviews with her
165
psychologists.
Observing that Gagliardi was in court on federal question
jurisdiction, the court began its review of Boston Market's motion by
66
determining whether state law privileges applied at all in this lawsuit.'
Typically, actions involving both federal and state law claims are
determined under federal law. 167 Notwithstanding, Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 provides that evidentiary privileges should be governed by
federal common law "only ifa relevant rule of law has not been
'otherwise ...provided by Act of Congress.""4 68 The district court
concluded that, with HIPAA, Congress spoke to the protection to be

161. EEOC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338.
162. Id. at *2.
163. Id. at*1.
164. Id. at * 1-2.
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id. at *6.
167. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *7 (citing Tesser v. Bd. of Educ.,
154 F. Supp. 2d 388, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)).
168. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *7 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501
(emphasis added)); see also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981)
(noting the general principle that courts develop federal common law only when
Congress has not spoken to a particular issue).
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extended to PHI. 169 Therefore, HIPAA and its associated promulgations
control the release of PHI to Boston Market, not Rule 501 and federal
1 70
common law.
The court then turned its consideration to HIPAA, and, quoting Law
v. Zuckerman,17 1 it noted that HIPAA "radically changed the landscape
of how litigators can conduct informal discovery in cases involving
medical treatment."'' 72 Because plaintiffs were relying on state privacy
laws to defeat Boston Market's motion, the court focused on HIPAA's
preemption provision to determine the applicability of New York law to
the case at bar. 17 3 Reciting the stringency standard promulgated in the
HIPAA Privacy Rules, Gagliardi argued that New York law was more
stringent than HIPAA and, therefore, was controlling. 74 The court
disagreed, perceiving a difference between a "federal law that does not
preempt a state law and a federal law that incorporates a state rule of
law."' 175 The court invoked previous authority within its federal district
and within the Seventh Circuit to conclude that more stringent state laws
do not govern in federal question cases. 176 Accordingly, New York law
was inapplicable. 171
With HIPAA as the applicable law, the court turned to the
permissibility of Boston Market's request for ex parte interviews.' 78 It
began by proclaiming that HIPAA neither expressly prohibited nor
expressly authorized ex parte communications with health providers for
an opposing party. 179 However, as a practical matter, the court found it
unlikely that many health care providers would be willing to participate
in ex parte communications with adverse counsel for fear of violating
HIPAA.180 Acknowledging that Boston Market could not cite to any
post-HIPAA case allowing ex parte contact with plaintiffs treating
physicians,' 8 ' the court identified only two courts having considered the
propriety of such contact, Law v. Zuckerman and Crenshaw v. MONY
169. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *7.
170. Id.
171. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F.Supp. 2d 705 (S.D. Md. 2004).
172. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *8 (quoting Law, 307 F. Supp. 2d
at 711).
173. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *10.
174. Id. at*lO0-11.
175. Id. at *12 (quoting Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 03 Civ. 8695 (RCC), 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4530, *1, *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004)).
176. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *12 (citing Northwestern Mem'l
Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 2004)).
177. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *13.
178. Id. at*16.
179. Id.
180. Id. at*19.
181. Id. at *20.
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Life Ins. Co. 182 Referencing them as guideposts and persuaded by their
analyses, the court ruled that ex parte communications regarding the
disclosure of PHI, although not expressly barred by HIPAA, nonetheless
posed "too great a risk of running afoul of that statute's strong federal
' 83
policy in favor of protecting the privacy of patient medical records."'
Therefore, to the extent that Boston Market requested ex parte release of
Gagliardi's PHI, the court declined to so permit.' 84 In this regard, Boston
Market represents the continued, pro-plaintiff, expansionist application
of the HIPAA Preemption Doctrine, favoring PHI confidentiality over
the defendant's (in this case, the defendant-employer's) interests in ex
parte communications.
2.

Beard v. City of Chicago'85 and the Covered Entity Defense

Plaintiffs' counsel continued to receive the benefits of post-Privacy
Rules protectionism in Beard v. City of Chicago, a 2005 case from the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 186 Although
consistent with the above case law, Beard is distinctive in that its
plaintiff-employee actually uses HIPAA as a tool of compulsory
discovery as opposed to a tool of protective shielding. 87 Here, Lisa
Beard, an African-American female suffering from major depression,
188
worked as a paramedic for the City of Chicago Fire Department.
When the Department terminated her employment, Beard filed suit in
federal court, alleging gender and race discrimination in violation of
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and disability discrimination in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 189 During discovery,
Beard requested documents relating to medical leaves of absences taken
by other paramedics for psychological and substance abuse on the
ground that these co-workers were similarly situated and, therefore,
discoverable as a means to press her discrimination claims.' 90 The
Department objected on numerous grounds, including an assertion that
such production was prohibited by HIPAA. 9'
Considering the Department's HIPAA claims, the court first
addressed the Department's contention that it was a covered entity within
182. See supra notes 123-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of these two
cases.
183. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338 at *18.
184. Id. at *20.
185. Beard v. City of Chicago, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 374 (N.D. Il.2005).
186. Id. at*l.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at * 1-2.
190. Id. at *2.
191. Beard, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 374 at *2.
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the meaning of HIPAA and, thus, prohibited from providing the
information.1 92 To this the court ruled that the Department did not meet
93
the definition of a "health plan" or a "health care clearinghouse."'
Regarding the Department's claim that it was a "health care provider,"
the court expressed doubt but held that, even if true, the Department was
not engaged in the electronic transmission as required by HIPAA for the
94
standard to be applicable.
Next, the Department contended that the records were PHI and,
therefore, undiscoverable. 195 The court summarily rejected this claim,
noting that HIPAA exempts from PHI classification such documentation
held by "a covered entity in its role as employer."'196 Having implied that
the Department did not qualify as a covered entity, the court found the
statute inapplicable. 97 Assuming that the Department qualified as a
covered entity, which it did not, it maintained the records only in
connection with leaves of absences, and, therefore, held the records
solely within its capacity as employer.198 Such retention was exempted
from HIPAA coverage.1 99
Finally, the court rendered its decision that HIPAA was wholly
inadequate to shield the Department from discovery.200
If the
Department was not a covered entity, then HIPAA would be inapplicable
and unsuited for the Department's defense.20 '
If, however, the
Department qualified as a covered entity, HIPAA's disclosure rules
found in Section 164.512(e) would allow for the disclosure of PHI in
response to a discovery request absent a court order, as seen here.20 2 As
such, HIPAA presented no bar to discovery, and Beard's motion to
compel production was granted.20 3
Beard could easily be minimized as a quirky, technical aberration
with little impact on the national debate over HIPAA's impact on
defense discovery motions. However, a less restrained interpretation,
particularly within the realm of employment law, reads Beard as the first
instance in which HIPAA was successfully used as a plaintiffs sword
against a defendant's efforts to exclude discoverable materials.

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2004)).

197.

Beard, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 374 at *9.

198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
See id. at *6-10.

201.
202.
203.

Seeid, at *9.
See id.
Beard, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 374 at *24.
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Combined with Boston Market's successful utilization of the Privacy
Rules as a plaintiff-employee's shield against defendant-employer's
informal discovery methods, 20 4 these HIPAA-empowered, sword-andthe-shield approaches to litigation demonstrate the growing resilience
that plaintiffs have in defeating defense counsel efforts to engage in ex
parte discovery.
C. An Alternative Approach: Smith v. American Home Products
Corp.20 5 and the Prospect of Federal-StateCohesion
To date, substantive case law regarding the Privacy Rules within the
employment law context has transpired at the federal level. One would
expect that previous developments in federal courts would, therefore,
hold sway in subsequent employment law litigation. Law and Crenshaw
did just that, having influenced the holdings in Boston Market and Beard.
Consequently, the opportunity for state courts to impact the national
HIPAA debate and, perhaps, temper the arguably heavy-handed HIPAA
preemption afforded by federal courts, has yet to be realized. One such
case, well received but scantly cited, appeared in September 2003 when
the New Jersey Superior Court heard arguments in Smith v. American
Home Products Corp.20 6 Plaintiff-consumers (collectively, "Plaintiffs")
brought this personal injury class action lawsuit against American Home
Products Corp. and other manufacturers (collectively, "Defendants") of
the drug phenylpropanolamine ("PPA").2°7 Immediately before the court
was a unified motion by Defendants to compel ex parte interviews with
Plaintiffs' treating physicians. 0 8 Plaintiffs objected, claiming that the
Privacy Rules preempted such informal discovery procedures previously
permitted under New Jersey law in Stempler v. Speidell.2 °9
The court began its detailed analysis by acknowledging that the
passage of HIPAA and the enactment of the Privacy Rules dramatically
altered the practices of medicine and law. 2 10 However, the court rejected
Plaintiffs' contention that HIPAA unilaterally dismantled Stempler
204. See EEOC v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27338, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004).
205. Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm, 855 A.2d 608 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
206. Id.
207. Id.at 610.
208. Id. Another defense motion-not discussed in the body of the above
examination-was to request judicial approval of a revised, HIPAA-compliant medical
authorization form. Id. The court rejected the adequacy of the form, finding it deficient
because it did not accurately represent the permissible scope of PHI disclosure allowable
under Stempler and HIPAA. Id. at 626.
209. Smith, 855 A.2d at 626. For a discussion on Stempler, see supra note 69.
210. Smith, 855 A.2dat619.
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interviews as a tool for defense counsel.2 1' In the court's view, New
Jersey had long-established confidentiality protocols that sufficiently
preserved the privacy of PHI, as required by HIPAA.2 12 Specifically, in
Stempler, the New Jersey Supreme Court guaranteed the sanctity of the
patient-physician relationship by constructing three privacy barriers
around defense counsel when conducting ex parte interviews:
(1) provide plaintiffs counsel with reasonable notice as to the time and
place of the interview, (2) provide the physician with a description of the
anticipated scope of the conversation, and (3) clearly communicate that
the physician's participation was voluntary.2 13 The sanctity of this
relationship notwithstanding, the court nonetheless noted that the New
Jersey statute, as in HIPAA, contained an exception for civil litigation. 14
Where plaintiffs place their medical condition in question, "discovery,
including the use of informal discovery methods such as ex parte
interviews, is available to the defense within the safeguard authorizations
set forth in Stempler."21 5 The court reasoned that changes to these
discovery techniques were the exclusive province of the legislature.2 16 In
its task to decide the narrow issue of whether HIPAA preempted the
informal discovery techniques, the court concluded that the "answer is
217
plainly 'no.'",

The court, steeped in federalist rhetoric, invoked the strong national
policy against federal court intervention with pending state judicial
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. 2' 8
Such doctrine
limited the "congressional intrusion into states' traditional prerogative
and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their
citizens. 219 Premising its logic on the maxim that "preemption [was] not
to be lightly presumed,, 220 the court concluded that the issue of
211. Id. at 625-26.
212. Id. at 619.
213. Id. at 612 (citing Stempler v. Spiedell, 495 A.2d 857, 864 (N.J. 1985)). The
court cited subsequent case law to substantiate this assertion, including Estate of
Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1998) (finding the hospital liable for damages when it breached its duty of confidentiality
by failing to safeguard the privacy of a surgeon/employee operating in his capacity as a
patient).
214. Smith, 855 A.2d at 620 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-22.4 (2006)).
215. Smith, 855 A.2d at 620.
216. See id. at 621.
217. Id.
218. Id. (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457
U.S. 423, 431 (1982)).
219. Smith, 855 A.2d at 621 (quoting City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534
(1997)).
220. Smith, 855 A.2d at 621 (quoting Vill. of Ridgefield Park v. N.Y., Susquehanna &
W. Ry. Corp., 750 A.2d 57, 61 (N.J. 2000) (quoting Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M.,
725 A.2d 1104, 1111 (N.J. 1999)).
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preemption would turn on congressional intent. 221 After examining the
legislative record, the court could find no congressional intent to displace
any existing state law or ruling that favored ex parte communications.22
Nor could the court find in the statutory text of HIPAA any mention of
ex parte interviews with treating physicians.223 Because informal
discovery was not expressly addressed under HIPAA, the court
determined that state law should govern.224
Therefore, ex parte
interviews as a means of informal discovery were permissible under
Stempler.2 25
Critics can easily dismiss Smith as mere persuasive authority, not
binding on the courts of the federal judiciary. They would be correct in
their assessment but, arguably, shortsighted in their approach. Smith
stands for the prospect of cohesion,. balancing the privacy concerns of
HIPAA with the preservation of state legislative and judicial
prerogatives. Since its announcement in September 2003, Smith has
been followed by only one court, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, in the 2005 case of Croskey v. BMW of North
America, Inc.226 However, should additional federal courts follow suit,
Smith and its interest-balancing approach has the potential of supplanting
Law and Crenshaw as the formulary model by which future courts will
assess privacy concerns and HIPAA preemption.
V.

A.

Time Out: Analysis and Proposal Going Forward for Employment
Law Litigants
Analysis

While litigation pertaining to the Privacy Rules remains in its
infancy, several telltale signs from the above case law suggest that
HIPAA has fundamentally altered discovery in employment law
litigation by dramatically limiting defendant-employer's informal
accessibility to plaintiff-employee's PHI. Within those federal and state

221. Smith, 855 A.2d at 621, 626.
222. Id. at 622.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 623.
225. Id. at 624. The court ultimately denied the defendant's motion, however, but
based its conclusion on the size of the plaintiff class and the "extreme" complexity of the
plaintiffs' mass tort case. Id at 625. Combined, these elements made the performance of
ex parte interviews unwieldy and unnecessary.
Smith, 855 A.2d at 626-27.
Notwithstanding, Stempler interviews remained a viable discovery tool for future
litigants. Id. at 627.
226. Croskey v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. 02-CV-73747-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3673 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14. 2005).
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jurisdictions that previously allowed ex parte communications, HIPAA's
preemption doctrine has apparently foreclosed upon the continued
viability of ex parte talks between defendant-employer and plaintiffemployee's treating physicians. 227 This foreclosure encompasses both
state and federal causes of action: litigation invoking state law (for
example, an employee's suit alleging intentional infliction of emotional
distress) is just as susceptible to the preemption doctrine as are wholly
federal question lawsuits (for example, an employee's suit claiming
violations of the ADA). In this regard, HIPAA knows no boundaries.
Nor are those pre-HIPAA jurisdictions denying ex parte communications
categorically immune from the preemption doctrine. Should the PHI
protections afforded by these states fail HIPAA's stringency standard,
they will be preempted by the federal floor afforded by the Privacy
Rules. Only otherwise would the more stringent state law prevail. The
consequences of such changes are mixed, as the Privacy Rules have
generated advantages and disadvantages impacting plaintiff-employee
and defendant-employer alike.
There are three major advantages inaugurated by HIPAA's
discovery rules. First is the realization of public policy. Society in
general expects that conversations with treating physicians will remain in
the strictest of confidences.22 8 HIPAA facilitates this. As with the
analogous attorney-client privilege, discussions between patients and
physicians build trust and empower physicians to better address, care for,
and treat patients and their symptoms. Absent such expectations of
privacy, patients might be less forthcoming about their medical
conditions for fear of subsequent, legal disclosure. This, in turn, would
limit the physician's means of and successes in treatment. In this regard,
the public policy remedy, HIPAA's prohibitions on ex parte
communications, is logically sound. This promotion of public health
care ideals at the expense of some defendant-employer discovery
methods transcends a mere plaintiff-employee procedural victory.
Simultaneously, it cannot be unilaterally pooh-poohed by employers
either, for they indirectly benefit in two key areas. In their personal
capacities, managers and employer officers, as individual patients,
benefit from the freedom of communications fostered by HIPAA's
Privacy Rules. In their professional capacities, employers arguably
229
experience indirect benefits through lower health care premiums,
227. See supra note 67.
228. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 960 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
229. Annual health care premiums increase or decrease based upon the volume and
expense associated with the employer-provided health plan - i.e., for all but the smallest
employers, the premiums are experience-rated. See Robert F. Rich & Julian Ziegler,
Genetic Discriminationin Health Insurance-ComprehensiveLegal Solutionsfor a (Not
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lower lost opportunity costs, 23 0 and potentially lower damage awards in
employer-employee litigated matters.23 1 On balance, therefore, the
public policy advantages of HIPAA's ex parte preclusions benefit both
plaintiff-employees strategically and defendant-employers tangentially.
A second advantage of HIPAA's ex parte prohibitions is that the
Privacy Rules established a baseline national standard for treating PHI.
As noted above, over twenty pre-HIPAA jurisdictions allowed some
form of ex parte talks between defense counsel and plaintiffs treating
physician. 232
Nationalized, this jurisdictional split resulted in a
schizophrenic treatment of identically situated plaintiff-employees not
because of merit but because of mere residency status. The federal floor
corrected this inequitable result by ensuring that plaintiff-employees in
all jurisdictions are afforded a minimum standard of PHI care. Operating
as a "statutory stare decisis," if you will, this approach extends
continuity and predictability where previously absent, and it discourages
(but does not eliminate) forum shopping in which some national or
multinational defendant-employers may seek to engage, if available.
A third advantage of the Privacy Rules is that they work to level the
playing field between the parties by curtailing informal fishing
expeditions by defendant-employers. Absent HIPAA and the ex parte
prohibitions, in numerous jurisdictions, defendant-employers were
allowed to quiz a plaintiffs treating physicians in a variety of manners.
Ostensibly, defendant-employers proceeded under the Fairness Doctrine:
if plaintiff-employees have unfettered access to such information, it is
only fair that defendant-employers have the same. Most assuredly
fairness was only part of the concern; defendant-employers also wanted
access to additional information (related or not) that would prove, or at
least imply, alternative causes for the plaintiff-employee's aggrieved
condition. In doing so, they could potentially embarrass the plaintiff into
dropping the suit or settling for a pittance, especially if the plaintiff had a
history of mental health issues. If this failed, they could file motions for
summary judgment that, if granted, threw them into the appellate courts
(if even appealed) where the standards of review favored them over those
of an unpredictable jury trial. By curtailing this practice, the Privacy
So) Special Problem?, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 5, 11 (2005)."

Uninhibited patient-

physician communication should yield better medical care and faster treatments, thus
resulting in fewer continuous claims and, correspondingly, lower health care costs.
230. Such lost opportunity costs include the indirect financial costs associated with
medically-related employee absences (such as the cost of finding a replacement) and
decreased productivity.
231. Confidential patient-physician communication should result in better, faster
treatment. This, in turn, should result in reduced medical costs and, correspondingly,
reduced damages incurred by plaintiff-employees."
232. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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Rules better situated plaintiff-employees in their efforts to survive
summary judgment, thereby allowing them their proverbial day in court.
Short-term pleasures can result in long-term regrets, as these above
advantages-promotion of public policy, realization of a national PHI
standard, and elimination of unmonitored fishing expeditions-are not
without three significant counterbalances. The first critical disadvantage
of HIPAA's ex parte prohibitions is the sheer cost that formal discovery
alone entails. Informal discovery is cheap, and in an increasingly
litigious society, cost implications cannot be ignored. In response to this
concern, the Petrillo court was somewhat Pollyannic when it proposed,
among other things, interrogatories as a suitable substitution for
depositions.23 3 Most practitioners will agree that interrogatories elicit
limited useful information as they, unlike depositions, are routinely
completed by attorneys or submitted only after legal review. As such,
the elements of spontaneity and unpredictability are usually lacking. The
depositional costs of formal discovery, including attorneys and
supporting staff, court recorders, and travel expenses, combined with
scheduling conflicts exponentially increase the costs for defendantemployers. Nor are plaintiff-employees insulated, for the mere fact that
depositions are necessary reflects plaintiff's objection to ex parte
Consequently, they, too, must endure the costs
communications.
associated with having their counsel in attendance. By eliminating ex
parte talks, HIPAA stands to raise the bar and the costs associated with
all related employer-employee legal disputes.
In addition to increased costs, the second and third disadvantages of
the Privacy Rules, discussed in tandem, are its impact on the expediency
and efficiency (collectively, the timeliness) of the litigation process.
While plaintiffs' attorneys understandably bemoan so-called fishing
expeditions sometimes utilized by unscrupulous defendants searching for
proverbial red herrings, these processes also serve as a means of ferreting
out those unscrupulous plaintiffs wishing to hedge damning information
that either directly or indirectly bears upon their aggrieved condition.
Presumably, the prevalence of such abuses is limited, whereas legitimate
endeavors served to remove meritless claims from the courts, thereby
facilitating greater judicial expediency. In eliminated this balance, the
Privacy Rules nationally prescribed a mild form of judicial favoritism, a
Cinderella syndrome, if you will-aiding plaintiff-employees at the
expense of the sensibility and attractiveness of the Fairness Doctrine
favored by several pre-HIPAA courts. Where informal discovery
traditionally served as an effective tool for hastening the discovery
process, increased formalization of the pretrial process brought about by
233.

See Petrillo.499 N.E.2d at 960.
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the elimination of ex parte communications taxes both parties and the
courts in terms of time and oversight, respectively. Cumulatively, and
strategically, the Privacy Rules have benefited plaintiffs on-balance, but
what plaintiffs have won is a Pyrrhic victory in terms of decreased
efficiency and increased time and money costs.
B.

Proposal

Balancing the competing interests of privacy expectations and
national standardization on the one hand with cost effectiveness and
procedural timeliness on the other is no easy task. Advocates on each
side of the issue raise legitimate concerns impacting plaintiff-employees
and defendant-employers alike. The most measured approach to date,
one that maximized the advantages and minimized the disadvantages, is
that adopted by the New Jersey Superior Court in Smith.234 There, the
court balanced the plaintiffs privacy expectations against the
defendant's desire for cost effectiveness and judicial expediency. 235 It
concluded by adopting a compromise standard that permitted ex parte
contacts by defense counselors within protective controls afforded by
state law.236 It, therefore, receives the endorsement of this article.
Smith is most respectful of federalist principles and state privacy
law. At the same time, it is most consistent with the policy intent behind
the 2002 HIPAA Privacy Rules: preservation of the confidentiality of
patient PHI. With Smith came the recognition that the competing
interests of plaintiffs and defendants can be appropriately balanced
through synthesis, not subordination, of state and federal law. Whereas
Law, Crenshaw, and their progeny trumpeted an expansive HIPAA
Preemption Doctrine that virtually thwarted health-related ex parte
interviews within their respective jurisdictions, the Smith court declined
to adopt such a radically pro-plaintiff policy that simultaneously and
unilaterally dismantled state privacy laws via preemption. Rather, the
Smith court recognized the parity between HIPAA's privacy concerns on
the one hand with the state's general authority to regulate its own judicial
and administrative proceedings on the other. This was accomplished by
pointing out two underlying facts. First, neither HIPAA's statutory text
nor the Congressional record indicated a federal desire to proscribe ex
parte communications. As such, state law governed in this area.
Second, both New Jersey statute and HIPAA carved out PHI exceptions
for civil litigation, thereby requiring plaintiffs who place their medical
234.
Super.
235.
236.

Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. Wyeth-Ayerst Pharm, 855 A.2d 608 (N.J.
Ct. Law Div. 2003).
Seeid. at 615.
See id. at 625-26.
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conditions in dispute to fairly expose themselves to the elements of
defense critique. This allowance, which facilitated faster and less
expensive discovery, was tempered, however, and not intended to serve
as a blank check for defense counselors. The Stempler privacy barriers
constructed around defendants remained controlling while the attorneys
conducted ex parte interviews. This approach, which balanced the
privacy concerns of the plaintiffs with the fairness and judicial
expediency concerns of the defendants, best harmonized the advantages
and disadvantages discussed above, and it is the encouragement of this
article that courts adopt its logic in order to address and effectuate the
privacy and cost concerns of all parties going forward.
VI. Conclusion: Touchdown or Fumble?
The debate over HIPAA continues ten years after its enactment.
Particularly within rank-and-file Republican circles, this discussion has
intensified. Once the champion of simple health care reform and an
original backer of HIPAA, former House Republican Leader Dick
Armey now laments his decision to support HIPAA in light of its
perceived and unintended consequences:
HIPAA is a classic example of legislative panic.... The fact is that
HIPAA was a mistake.
It was oversold. It had unintended
consequences. It turned out that HIPAA did little to make insurance

more portable, but it did set a dangerous precedent for the federal
regulation of health insurance. We thought we were cracking down
on Medicare fraud. Instead, we turned doctors into criminal suspects,
with armed federal agents seizing their filing cabinets. We felt
confident that we had guaranteed medical privacy and paperless
billing, but HIPAA appears to have expanded23 7bureaucrats' access to
our medical records without a search warrant.

In Armey's view, HIPPA was proposed as a conservative counterbalance
to Clinton Care; however, it became the first installment of Clinton
Care.2 38 Political conservatives echo Armey's assessment. As Professor
Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago College of Law writes,
"HIPAA continued the search for government control [of the health care
industry] by the salami tactic: take control over the industry one slice at a
time. 23 9 If true, for conservative politicians HIPAA represents a
237.

Dick Armey, Just Gotta Learn From the Wrong Things You Done, CATO
Vol. 22, No. 1, at 6-7 (Spring/Summer 2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/
journal/j22n l/cj22n 1-2.pdf (last visited June 18, 2006).
238. Id. at 7.
239. Richard A. Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy: Its Unintended and Intended
Consequences, CATO JOURNAL Vol. 22, No. 1, at 27 (Spring/Summer 2002),
https://www.cato.org/pubs/joumal/cj22n I/cj22n 1-3.pdf (last visited June 18, 2006).
JOURNAL
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political miscalculation of seismic proportions.
Politics temporarily aside, within the context of employment law
litigation, HIPPA, and particularly the 2002 Privacy Rules, represents a
sea change for informal discovery tactics. Prior to HIPAA's 1996
enactment, no fewer than twenty-one state and federal jurisdictions
explicitly permitted various degrees of ex parte communications between
defendant-employer and plaintiff-employee's treating physicians.
HIPAA and the 2002 Privacy Rules altered this dynamic in a
fundamental manner, as demonstrated in Law, Crenshaw, and Boston
Market: the availability of informal discovery is no longer a certainty.
Just the opposite: prognosticating on the topic would lead one to
conclude that the future availability of ex parte interviews is increasingly
dim. HIPAA's federal floor of privacy protection combines with its
preemption doctrine to supercede any state law to the contrary. Beard
further complicated matters for defense counsel: unlike plaintiffemployees, defendant-employers will rarely, if ever, succeed in availing
themselves of HIPAA's privacy shield to suppress discovery of human
resource records. In this regard, HIPAA not only acts as a shield for the
plaintiff-employee's use to deflect requests for ex parte talks; it also
serves as a sword that plaintiff's counsel can wield to attack defense
counsel's discovery tactics and limit any attempts at and potential gains
from a fishing expedition.
Through these lenses, therefore, HIPAA and the 2002 Privacy Rules
represent a mixed bag. For plaintiff-employees, HIPAA is political
touchdown, inadvertently secured by pro-business Republicans for the
ultimate benefit of pro-labor plaintiffs counsel.
For defendantemployers, HIPAA is a political fumble, unintentionally limiting their
means of PHI acquisition to onerous formal discovery requests. The
death knell of informal discovery has sounded, but is it complete? Law,
Crenshaw, Boston Market, and Beard imply as much, but the New Jersey
ruling in Smith combined with the relative newness of the 2002 Privacy
Rules warrant additional time before the obituary can be written. And, in
the politically charged world of health care reform, change is just a ballot
box away.

